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Three Assumptions Lawyers  
Must Never Make
Brett G. Scharffs1
I. Introduction
 “You did what!?” my Uncle bellowed.
 “I assumed you saw me pass you,” I said defensively.
 My Uncle Dick, no children of his own, had brought 13-year-old 
me along on one of his epic bicycle treks down the California coast near 
Carmel. Inevitably he ended up waiting for me to catch up, and when I 
finally did, he was ready to hop back on his bicycle and begin peddling 
again. For once, when I caught up, he was deep in conversation with 
another cyclist on the side of the road. I waved and hurried on, savoring 
the prospect of choosing my spot to rest and wait for him for a change. 
Finally, I stopped and rested. So this is what it feels like to be out front, 
I thought.
 But when 30 minutes passed, I got nervous enough to climb on my 
bike and pedal back. When I got to the spot where I had passed my uncle, 
he was no longer there. Now I was concerned, and I decided I had bet-
ter continue retracing my trail, although I couldn’t be sure that he hadn’t 
passed me at some point during my rest. By the time I met up with him, he 
must have been pretty worried, but all I saw was anger.
 “You what?” he repeated.
 “I assumed you . . .”
 “You assumed?” he said sarcastically. “Spell it.”
 I meekly complied. “A-s-s . . .”
 “Stop. What does that spell?”
 “Ass?” I answered doubtfully.
 “Continue,” he ordered.
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 “. . . u-m-e.”
 “What does that spell?” he demanded.
 I hesitated. “u . . . m-e?”
 “That’s what assuming does,” he declared. “Makes an ‘ass’ out of ‘you’ 
and ‘me.’”
 “Don’t ever assume,” he ordered, and to his credit my Uncle Dick 
 communicated the message with a directness and clarity that makes the 
experience as vivid today as it was over 25 years ago.
II. Assumptions and Presumptions
 Lawyers make assumptions many times every day. We may wish to 
think that we are all about evidence and proof—Just the facts, ma’am—but 
in reality, making assumptions is the bread and butter of our professional 
lives. An assumption involves believing something to be true without suf-
ficient grounds for knowing it to be true. When we assume, we take some-
thing for granted without proof.2 As lawyers we routinely make assump-
tions, sometimes formally,3 as when we write an opinion letter,4 sometimes 
informally,5 as when we engage in stereotyping or attempt to exploit the 
suspected prejudices of others.6
 Closely related to assumptions are presumptions. A presumption 
relieves a party in whose favor the presumption runs of the burden of 
proof. “Legal presumptions . . . are not a ‘means of proof ’ . . . [but rather] a 
dispensation of the need to furnish proof.”7 For example, we presume that 
someone is “legally dead” when they have been absent for a given length 
of time without evidence that they have been seen or heard.8 The most 
famous presumption in the law is the presumption of innocence,9 but our 
criminal system is based upon even deeper assumptions about individual 
responsibility for one’s actions.10 Some presumptions are rebuttable, such 
as when we presume that a child of a certain age is not capable of commit-
ting a crime.11
 As lawyers we often have to make snap judgments, sometimes in 
rapid-fire succession, which often are built on an undergirding of assump-
tions. We also make assumptions when we form a hypothesis and develop 
evidence to prove our “theory of the case.” But while making assumptions 
is a necessary and natural part of our professional lives, making assump-
tions can also get us into trouble. Making assumptions may reflect lazi-
ness or pride: laziness when we trust our impressions without doing the 
hard work of verification, and pride when we close our eyes to evidence 
contrary to our favored presuppositions. I want to suggest that lawyers 
are particularly prone to mistakes that arise from making assumptions. 
Let me explain.
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III. Three Perilous Assumptions
 While it would be quite easy to compile a long list of assumptions that 
lawyers are prone to make and that routinely cause lawyers grief,12 there 
are three assumptions that pose particular peril to lawyers. It would hardly 
be an exaggeration to say that these are three assumptions that a lawyer 
must never make.
 1. First, don’t assume you are the good guy.13 You probably are not.
 2. Second, don’t assume you understand the other guy. You almost 
certainly do not.
 3. Third, don’t assume you are right. You are most likely wrong.
 Now, please do not misunderstand me. It is as important for me to 
avoid making these assumptions as it is for you. And, while you are prob-
ably not the good guy, you might well not be the bad guy either. You very 
well may understand the other guy, in a partial and limited way. And you 
are probably not entirely wrong. Although your spouse and I are certain 
that you are not entirely right.
 Unfortunately, avoiding these assumptions requires a large dose of 
self-doubt, empathy, and humility, and there is precious little in our pro-
fessional education or practice that helps us cultivate this particular set of 
habits or traits of character. Indeed, our professional lives are organized 
and structured in a way that almost compels us to make these particular 
assumptions.
IV. The Organization and Structure of Our Professional Lives
 What is it about the professional lives of lawyers that makes us partic-
ularly prone to assuming that we are the good guy, that we understand the 
other guy, and that we are right? Three features of the legal profession are 
of particular significance, each of which is closely related to one of these 
three assumptions.
A. The Adversarial System
 First and most obviously, ours is an adversarial profession, and this 
means we take sides. There are two important implications of this rather 
pedestrian observation. First, we tend to identify with the side we are on. 
As we identify with our cause, we tend increasingly to think of it as being 
good, or right, or just. Naturally, we come to think of ourselves as the good 
guys. Second, we tend to caricaturize, villainize, or in extreme cases even 
dehumanize our opponents. This tendency is a well-documented feature 
of rivalries, feuds, and war.14 While this tendency is hopefully less severe 
in the law than when facing a mortal enemy, there is still a strong pro-
pensity to think of the other side as the bad guys. The reality, of course, is 
likely much more complex, and in most situations there will be good and 
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bad, right and wrong, as well as the potential for abuse on both sides. As 
Isaiah Berlin said, quoting Immanuel Kant, “Out of timber so crooked as 
that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built.”15
 This risk of assuming you are the good guy is particularly acute for pros-
ecutors, who quite naturally view themselves as being on the side of truth 
and justice. But prosecutors are in a uniquely powerful position and face 
a particular proclivity to abuse the weapons at their disposal. For exam-
ple, I have an acquaintance who was indicted nine years ago for securi-
ties fraud. For nearly a decade he was bullied and hounded by prosecutors 
who never quite got around to pursuing or resolving his case. From time 
to time he was threatened with a lengthy prison sentence, and the govern-
ment attorneys tried to cajole him into being a witness against his father, 
who had been in business with him. Over this period of almost 10 years, he 
spent more than a hundred thousand dollars on lawyers’ bills. Finally, on 
the eve of trial, the government offered him a deal. He pled guilty to one 
misdemeanor. The negotiated description of his alleged misconduct was 
so technical that even as a professor who teaches securities law it was dif-
ficult to discern exactly what he had done wrong. Nevertheless, this crimi-
nal indictment hung over his head for nearly 10 years, caused many sleep-
less nights, and took a toll on his marriage, not to mention his relationship 
with his father, which has been all but destroyed.
 I suspect the prosecutors in this case have little or no idea the ordeal 
they put this man through. Indeed, they probably think they showed 
statesmanship and restraint in allowing him to plead to a lesser offense 
and avoid prison. They probably assume they were the good guys and that 
they let him off easy.
B. Stereotyping
 A second reason we make unwarranted assumptions relates to the 
ways in which we rely upon stereotypes. As lawyers we are in the busi-
ness of making quick assessments. We often deal with people or situations 
that seem quite familiar, and we become adept at noting patterns and simi-
larities. After years of practice we lawyers may come to believe that there is 
nothing we haven’t seen before.
 One of my mentors, Dean Anthony Kronman, has argued that legal 
training, especially the case method, cultivates in students an attitude of 
“moral cosmopolitanism that is best expressed, perhaps, by the old Roman 
motto nihil humanorum alienum meum est, ‘nothing human is foreign to 
me.’”16 Lawyers are less likely to be gullible than they were before begin-
ning their legal training, but they are also less likely to be trusting, and are 
unlikely to be surprised by human selfishness and perfidiousness. Having 
seen so much so many times, it becomes easy for lawyers to mistakenly 
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think they know exactly what is going on when they encounter a situation 
that looks very familiar.
 We assume we understand the other guy because we have become 
expert in assessing situations and people. This can lead us to making 
 confident, and often inaccurate, assumptions about people or situations 
based upon a paucity of real evidence. Thus, one of the most common 
quips about lawyers is “Often wrong, never in doubt.” We may jump to 
conclusions too quickly. For example, we are all familiar with how biases 
and prejudices of various types tend to become more hardened and 
extreme as we grow older.
C. Passing Judgment
 Closely related to assumptions made when stereotyping are assump-
tions made when passing judgment. As lawyers we are constantly passing 
judgment on others: Are they telling the truth? Can they be trusted? Are 
they virtuous or vicious? Over time we get better at making snap judg-
ments. The tendency to pass judgment emphatically and confidently grows 
stronger as we gain experience and expertise—indeed, simply as a facet of 
growing older. As we age, our mode of problem solving gradually changes 
from one based upon analysis and calculation to one based upon pattern 
recognition. In his book The Wisdom Paradox, neuroscientist Elkhonon 
Goldberg describes this process:
Frequently, when I am faced with what would appear from the outside to be a 
challenging problem, the grinding mental computation is somehow circum-
vented, rendered, as if by magic, unnecessary. The solution comes effortlessly, 
seamlessly, seemingly by itself. What I have lost with age in my capacity for 
hard mental work, I seem to have gained in my capacity for instantaneous, 
almost unfairly easy insight.17
 Today some people urge us to believe that the immediate judg-
ments we make in a blink of an eye are more accurate and reliable than 
the decisions we make when we engage in a lengthy process of investiga-
tion, thought, and deliberation. For example, in his book Blink, Malcolm 
Gladwell describes an experiment involving student evaluations of 
teachers. A psychologist gave students “three ten-second videotapes of a 
teacher—with the sound turned off—and found they had no difficulty at 
all coming up with a rating of the teacher’s effectiveness.”18 When the clips 
were cut back to five seconds, “the ratings were the same.” These ratings 
were “remarkably consistent even when she showed the students just two 
seconds of videotape.” When these snap judgments were compared with 
evaluations made by students after a full semester in a professor’s class, 
the outcomes were essentially the same. “A person watching a silent two- 
second video clip of a teacher he or she has never met will reach conclu-
sions about how good that teacher is that are very similar to those of a 
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student who has sat in the teacher’s class for an entire semester. That’s the 
power of our adaptive unconscious.”19
 But our instantaneous judgments and snap assessments are almost 
certainly incomplete and quite probably wrong. Why?
 For one thing, our stereotypes and judgments often rest upon preju-
dices that we don’t even suspect we possess. For example, in the past 30 
years since putting up screens between musicians auditioning for orches-
tra jobs and the committees evaluating them has become commonplace, 
“the number of women in the top u.s. orchestras has increased fivefold.”20
 Another cause of our proclivity to judge imperfectly is the human 
capacity for self-deception, which is surely one of our most highly devel-
oped capacities. Consider the hypocrite who beheld the mote (a small par-
ticle or speck of dust) in his brother’s eye, but failed to consider the beam 
(a large piece of timber or metal that is long in proportion to its thick-
ness) that was in his own eye.21 Why is it that we have such a keen eye 
for spotting self-deception in others, but a big blind spot for recognizing 
it in ourselves? Part of the reason, I suspect, is that we tend to judge our-
selves based upon our intentions, whereas we judge other based upon their 
actions.
V. Corrective Actions
 I would like to suggest several concrete steps we can take to counteract 
the tendency to make unwarranted assumptions, including the assumption 
that we are the good guy, the assumption that we understand the other 
guy, and the assumption that we are right.
A. Keep an open mind
 First, when trying to counter these powerful assumptions, it is impor-
tant to keep our minds open to contrary evidence. Myson of Chen, one of 
the Seven Sages, advised, “We should not investigate facts by the light of 
arguments, but arguments by the light of facts.”22
 Judge Learned Hand is often considered the most influential American 
judge who was never on the Supreme Court. Judge Hand was famous for 
the painstaking and evenhanded approach he took to the law. Justice Felix 
Frankfurter occasionally referred to Hand as the “modern Hamlet,” and 
Hand’s biographer, Gerald Gunther, noted that Hand “was uncertain about 
the proper result in most cases, even after decades of judicial experience.”23 
Hand believed that every judge should first and foremost entertain the 
possibility that he or she might be mistaken. Hand said:
Of those qualities on which civilization depends, next after courage, it seems 
to me, comes an open mind, and, indeed, the highest courage is, as Holmes 
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used to say, to stake your all upon a conclusion which you are aware  tomorrow 
may prove false.24
 The truth is we may not be the good guy and we almost certainly do 
not understand the other guy. This is not only because we have not walked 
the proverbial mile in his moccasins, we often lack the imagination and 
empathy to even consider what such a journey might look and feel like. 
A few years ago I wanted to learn more about the word “empathy,” so 
I  looked it up in my 13-volume Oxford English Dictionary. Imagine my 
surprise when the word “empathy” was nowhere to be found in the “E” 
volume.25 Upon reflecting on my treatment at the hands of my tutors as a 
student at Oxford, it seemed to me quite fitting that this was a concept that 
was not even a  linguistic possibility at Oxford.26
 One reason why we sometimes trust our assumptions more than we 
should is that we mistake having our assumptions vindicated with having 
them justified. Consider prejudice and stereotyping. Perhaps I believe that 
Mormon men are narrow-minded and sexist, even though I haven’t really 
ever known any Mormon men. I have heard this about Mormons and have 
no reason to doubt that it is true. I meet a Mormon man and he behaves 
in a way that I view as being narrow-minded and sexist. My assumption 
about Mormon men has been vindicated. I saw what I was expecting to 
see. I can say emphatically that every Mormon man I have met is narrow-
minded and sexist. With this firsthand experience, my assumption about 
Mormon men will likely become even stronger, and my sense that my 
assumption is valid will be stronger, too. Indeed, after a few more verifying 
experiences, I probably won’t even view this as an assumption, but rather 
a fact.
 But the fact that one of our assumptions has been vindicated does not 
mean that it is or was justified. Justification involves having a sufficient 
basis in reason for believing something to be true. A belief that Mormon 
men are narrow-minded and sexist is only justified if, based upon a broad 
array of evidence and proof, a general rule can be inferred from a large 
number of cases. Even then, a justified belief will probably be qualified by 
a variety of caveats and limitations that have emerged from our observa-
tion of numerous examples of the phenomena in question to account for 
exceptions and variations.
 It is easy to mistake vindication as justification, especially given our 
tendency to give more weight to evidence that confirms our presupposi-
tions and to discount evidence that calls our assumptions into doubt. 
Perhaps this explains why many members of minority groups are so sensi-
tive to portrayals of members of their groups that reflect stereotypes. The 
American writer Jessamyn West once observed, “We want the facts to fit 
the preconceptions. When they don’t, it is easier to ignore the facts than 
to change the preconceptions.”27 This tendency to ignore facts that do not 
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fit our preconceptions, while problematic for everyone, can be even more 
problematic for the lawyer. As La Rochefoucauld memorably said, “There 
is nothing more horrible than the murder of a beautiful theory by a brutal 
gang of facts.”28 Many a courtroom lawyer has witnessed the massacre of 
their beautiful theories.
B. Be a Skeptic, Not a Cynic
 A second protective measure against making unwarranted assump-
tions lies in the distinction between being a skeptic and a cynic. When 
I was a student, Dean Guido Calabresi repeated like a mantra, “For a law-
yer skepticism is necessary, cynicism devastating.” What is the difference 
between being skeptical and being cynical, and why is it important that 
a lawyer be one, but dangerous if he or she is the other? I had thought of 
the two terms as more or less synonymous. In time, however, I began to 
understand what Dean Calabresi may have meant by this distinction.
 A lawyer must be skeptical. We see people acting at their self- 
interested worst. Clients do not always tell the truth, even to their lawyers. 
Memories tend to be selective and self-serving. Opposing counsel often 
engage in grandstanding and gamesmanship. A lawyer cannot afford to 
take things at face value; the unexpected and improbable must be foreseen 
and planned for. How things will look in litigation must be anticipated at 
a time when partners seem to see eye to eye. Lawyers encounter human 
beings treating each other with almost inconceivable indifference and 
 brutality. Lawyers know too much to be completely trusting.
 But a lawyer must not be cynical. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines a cynic as “one who shows a disposition to disbelieve in the sincer-
ity or goodness of human motives and actions, and is wont to express this 
by sneers and sarcasms.”29 The cynic exhibits contempt rather than com-
passion. Believing the worst of others serves as grounds for treating them 
with disregard.
 To be skeptical is to doubt whether someone is telling the truth; to 
be cynical is to doubt whether there is such a thing as truth, or whether 
being truthful matters at all. To be skeptical is to be unsurprised by 
human selfishness; to be cynical is to maintain that there is no such thing 
as selflessness. To be skeptical is to realize that people sometimes behave 
in ways that are insincere or deliberately hurtful; to be cynical is to disbe-
lieve in the human capacity for sincerity or goodness. To be skeptical is to 
recognize that we are each capable of evil; to be cynical is to believe only 
the worst about each other. To be skeptical is to recognize that matching 
means to ends can be difficult and controversial; to be cynical is to believe 
that one’s ends always justify one’s means. One can be doubtful, wary, and 
watchful without being contemptuous, sneering, and sarcastic.
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 A skillful, cynical legal technician is dangerous, the more dangerous 
for being the more skilled. In your practice as lawyers, there will be times 
when it will prove more difficult than you can possibly imagine to keep 
your skepticism from degenerating into cynicism. Especially at moments 
of extremity, it is useful to ask ourselves whether we have crossed the line 
from skepticism to cynicism. If we have, or if we cannot say for certain 
that we have not, we should be alarmed—not only out of concern for the 
damage we may work but also out of concern for the welfare of our own 
souls.
C. Doubt Thyself
 A third way in which we can avoid some of the pitfalls of unwarranted 
assumptions lies in having a measured tentativeness about our own opin-
ions, even those we hold strongly. In 1958, at age 87, Judge Hand delivered 
the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School. To the dis-
may of many in the audience, he expressed doubt about the correctness 
of the recent school desegregation cases. But, quoting Benjamin Franklin, 
Hand acknowledged his doubts about his own conclusions:
Having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by bet-
ter information or fuller consideration to change opinions even on important 
subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore 
that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to 
pay more respect to the judgment of others.30
 Unfortunately, this attitude does not seem to be characteristic of 
most of us as we grow older. The more common tendency is to become 
more set in our ways, more committed to our previous viewpoints, and 
more unwilling to reassess honestly our prior conclusions. Charles Alan 
Wright suggests that “[i]n spite of being a modern Hamlet—or, more 
likely, because of it—Learned Hand is firmly enshrined in the small group 
of judges who universally are regarded as great.”31 Simply being unsure or 
indecisive is not what made Hand great; rather, it was his open mind, his 
willingness to entertain opposing possibilities and to characterize each in 
its best possible light, and his capacity to understand and feel the indepen-
dent force exerted by each side of an argument.
 In cautioning us about the perils of passing judgment, I am not mak-
ing a postmodernist observation about the impossibility of differentiat-
ing between good and evil. There is a difference between right and wrong, 
good and bad, light and dark, and we can know it.32 But most truths are 
partial, and all human perceptions are imperfect. Too often we draw a 
stark dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity, when in reality our 
perceptions are objective, subjective, and relative—objective due to the 
character and traits of the thing being perceived, subjective due to the 
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character and traits of the person doing the perceiving, and relative due to 
outside factors such as the color and frequency of light. For example, when 
I conclude that you acted courageously, it is partly based upon something 
you did, partly based upon my own values and perceptions, and party 
based upon the contingencies of the situation.
VI. Conclusion
 My purpose has not been to denounce all assumptions. To the con-
trary, I have suggested that our work as lawyers requires us to make 
assumptions. Rather, my purpose has been to highlight certain assump-
tions that pose particular peril for lawyers, not only because they can lead 
us astray, but because they engender a kind of professional arrogance and 
hubris for which lawyers are all too famous.
 Whereas the adversarial system drives us to think of ourselves as the 
good guy, if we try to keep an open mind and strive to develop empathy, 
if we remain willing to alter our preconceptions when facts are contrary to 
our suppositions, then we will be more open to the possibility that we may 
not be completely in the right. Whereas the necessity of making snap judg-
ments and our increasing capacity to recognize patterns creates a strong 
tendency for us to assume that we understand the other guy, if we sub-
ject our stereotypes to verification, if we temper our skepticism before it 
degenerates into cynicism, if we genuinely strive to develop empathy, then 
we may retain the capacity for reassessment and correction. And whereas 
we may get better at exercising judgment as we grow in expertise and even 
wisdom over years of deliberate practice, if, like 87-year-old Judge Learned 
Hand, we can retain a healthy measure of self-doubt, then our judgments 
may be tempered by a measure of humility and open-mindedness that 
may enable us to transcend our natural inclinations and limitations, in life 
as well as in the law.
This Spirit of the Law address was given at byu Law School on March 9, 
2005. Reprinted from the Clark Memorandum, fall 2005, 10–19.
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Notes
 1. I am grateful to Danny Walker and the Spirit of the Law Board for the invita-
tion to speak today. I wish to thank Marjorie Fonnesbeck Layne for her kind and 
capable research assistance. This article is dedicated to the richly wrathful Richard 
Wrathall, my wonderful Uncle Dick. I love you. Copyright © 2005 Brett G. Scharffs.
 2. There are numerous related definitions of the term “assumption” that illus-
trate additional dimensions of the phenomena, including pretending to possess, as 
to “assume a virtue, if you have it not”; or taking something as one’s own, to appro-
priate, or usurp, as in to “assume an honor.” Synonyms include, to “put on, counter-
feit, sham, affect, pretend, simulate, feign.” Making assumptions is more related to 
appearance than to reality. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 70 
(10th ed. 1994).
 3. An example of a formal assumption in the law is the policy of inferring that 
someone who is engaged in obfuscation is trying to hide something. For exam-
ple, the law assumes that someone who pays child support is hiding something 
when he resists discovery of detailed financial information. See Philip G. Seastrom 
& Michelle L. Kusmider, Family Law Corner: Child Support and the High Income 
Earner, 41 Orange County Lawyer 40, 41 (1999).
 4. I once heard a lawyer brag that when he gave a validity opinion in connec-
tion with a securities offering, it was so filled with qualifications and disclaimers 
that a careful reading would reveal that he had actually said nothing that was not 
either based upon a stated assumption or a declaration in an officers certificate 
upon which he explicitly relied.
 5. One of the most problematic examples of informal assumptions in the law 
is racial profiling. See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-balanced Fourth Amendment: 
Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 851 
(2002). Cooper explains:
 Racial profiling does not provide information; it collapses all potential 
information around the assumption about behavior derived from the stereotype 
about one characteristic. Whereas a description of a suspect simplifies merely for 
purposes of proper identification, a racial profile takes very broadly defined char-
acteristics and associates any individual owning those characteristics with bad 
behavior.
 Id. at 872.
 6. To gain advantages for their clients, attorneys often exploit the suspected 
prejudices of jury members. In an attempt to combat the effect of jury preju-
dice in a case involving an altercation between a black student and a white stu-
dent in Anchorage, Alaska, the defense lawyers for the black student proposed a 
jury instruction that required the jury to engage in a “race-switching exercise” to 
assure they were not relying on racial-stereotype thinking. See James McComas 
& Cynthia Strout, Combating the Effects of Racial Stereotyping in Criminal Cases, 
23  Champion 22 (1999). A portion of the proposed jury instructions describing the 
“race- switching exercise” is as follows:
 To ensure that you have not made any unfair assessments based on racial 
stereotypes, you should apply a race-switching exercise to test whether stereotypes 
have affected your evaluation of the case. “Race-switching” involves imagining the 
same events, the same circumstances, the same people, but switching the races of 
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the parties and witnesses. For example, if the accused is African-American and the 
accuser is White, you should imagine a White accused and an African-American 
accuser. If your evaluation of the case is different after engaging in race-switching, 
this suggests a subconscious reliance on stereotypes. You must then reevaluate the 
case from a neutral, unbiased perspective.
 Id. at 24.
 7. Geoffrey J. Orr, Toward a Workable Civil Presumptions Rule in Louisiana, 
53 La. L. Rev. 1625, 1629 (1993).
 8. The Uniform Probate Code provides that an individual is presumed dead 
if he or she is “absent for a continuous period of 5 years, during which he (or she) 
has not been heard from, and whose absence is not satisfactorily explained after 
diligent search or inquiry.” u.p.c. § 1-107(5) (1990).
 9. See Cathy Lynne Bosworth, Pretrial Detainment: The Fruitless Search for the 
Presumption of Innocence, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 277 (1986) (documenting the history 
of the presumption of innocence and how the presumption has evolved in recent 
times).
 10. See Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: 
The True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 Duke L.J. 1031 (2003). Jones asserts 
that the theoretical justification for criminal punishment in the American criminal 
justice system is based on the idea that “offenders have made a voluntary choice to 
break the law, thus validating the imposition of a societal sanction.” Id. at 1031.
 11. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 
31 Ucla L. Rev. 503 (1984). Walkover explains:
 The common law’s resolution of this basic tension between culpability and 
juvenile status was lodged in the infancy defense. This defense constituted a 
series of presumptions that embodied largely intuitive judgments concerning a 
child’s capacity to take responsibility for individual acts. These presumptions had 
the effect of screening out the non-culpable from treatment as adult offenders. 
Children under the age of seven were conclusively presumed to be incapable of 
taking responsibility for their acts and thus were precluded from criminal adju-
dication. Children over the age of fourteen were regarded as adults and thus were 
presumed capable of committing crimes. Between these two ages the common law 
created a rebuttable presumption of incapacity.
 Id. at 511. The u.s. Supreme Court created a strong presumption when it held 
last week in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that it is cruel and unusual 
 punishment to execute an individual who was under the age of 18 at the time he 
committed the crime.
 12. Consider the following classics: “It doesn’t matter.” “No one will find out.” 
“No one will be hurt.” “I’m sure this case is still good law.” “These partners will be 
friends forever.” “I can handle this matter.” “I’ve still got time.” The list is virtually 
endless.
 13. No gender implication is intended by the use of the informal term “guy,” 
and hopefully none will be inferred.
 14. See John M. Kang, Deconstructing the Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2 Mich. 
J. Race & L. 283 (1997). Kang reports that during World War ii, when American 
sentiment toward the Japanese was strongly negative, the Los Angeles Times pub-
lished the following: “A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched—so 
a Japanese American, born of Japanese parents—grows up to be Japanese, not an 
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American.” Id. at 329. In addition, u.s. World War ii propaganda often depicted 
Japanese soldiers with “buck teeth, slanted eyes and with thick glasses.” Id.
 15. Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity xi (Henry Hardy 
ed., 1991) (quoting Immanuel Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in 
 weltbürgerlicher Absicht [1784]).
 16. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 159 (1993).
 17. Elkhonon Goldberg, The Wisdom Paradox: How Your Mind Can 
Grow Stronger as Your Brain Grows Older 9 (2005). Dr. Goldberg observes, 
“With age, the number of real-life cognitive tasks requiring a painfully effortful, 
deliberate creation of new mental constructs seems to be diminishing. Instead, 
problem-solving (in the broadest sense) takes increasingly the form of pattern 
 recognition.” Id. at 20.
 18. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without 
Thinking 12 (2005).
 19. Id. at 12–13.
 20. Id. at 250. Gladwell adds, “What the classical musical world realized was 
that what they had thought was a pure and powerful first impression—listening to 
someone play—was in fact hopelessly corrupted.” Id. at 250–51.
 21. “Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine 
eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam 
out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy 
brother’s eye.” Matthew 7:4–5 (King James Version).
 22. Quoted in Burton Stevenson, Home Book of Proverbs, Maxims and 
Familiar Phrases (1948).
 23. Justice Frankfurter’s characterization of Judge Hand as the “modern 
Hamlet” can be found in a letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles C. Burlington 
(Jan. 1933) (Burlington Papers, Harvard Law School). Gunther’s observation that 
Hand was uncertain about the proper result in most cases can be found in Gerald 
Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 136, 289 (1994).
 24. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights, in The Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 Lectures 1958, 75 (1962).
 25. In volume iii (d–e) of the 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, the 
word “empasma” is followed by the word “empatron.” 3e The Oxford English 
Dictionary 125 (1st ed. 1933).
 26. You will be relieved to learn that the first supplement to the 1933 edition of 
the oed includes the following definition of “empathy”: “The power of entering into 
the experience of or understanding objects or emotions outside ourselves.” The 
Oxford English Dictionary 329 (1st ed. Supp. 1933).
 27. Jessamyn West, The Quaker Reader 2 (The Viking Press ed. 1962).
 28. Francois Duc De La Rochefoucauld, Reflections, or Sentences 
and Moral Maxims (1678).
 29. The Oxford English Dictionary 1304 (1st ed. 1933).
 30. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights, in The Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 Lectures 1958, 75 (1962).
 31. Charles Alan Wright, A Modern Hamlet in the Judicial Pantheon, 93 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1841, 1841 (1995).
 32. And so can the postmodernist, as is evidenced all too frequently by her 
passionate devotion to the correctness of her own point of view. As a theoretical 
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matter, it may be the case that all truth is relative and that objectivity is impossible, 
but one cannot coherently assert these propositions, since doing so involves what 
philosophers have called operational self-refutation—the making of the assertion 
belies one’s belief in its truth.
